Abstract-The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a measure for the loss of optimality due to decentralized behavior. It has been studied in many settings but, surprisingly, not in the most fundamental queueing system involving customers' decisions, namely, the single server Markovian queue. We find that the loss of efficiency in such systems is bounded by 50% in most practical cases, in which the arrival rate of the customers is significantly lower than the service rate. We also find that the loss of efficiency has an interesting behavior in two aspects: first, it sharply increases as the arrival rate comes close to the service rate; second, it becomes unbounded exactly when the arrival rate is greater than the service rate, a surprising behavior because the system is always stable. Knowing these bounds is important for the queue controller, for example when considering an investment in added service capacity.
where is given. By using the operator defined in , it can be shown that the solution to the above equation is (26) which is indeed in the form of (A.4). We can also show, similar to the proof of , that . Hence, the steady-state solution is asymptotically stable with respect to the set of initial perturbations based on Definition 8.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a public agency operating a telephone service that treats callers in a first-come first-served order. A customer who finds the operator busy is informed about his position in the queue, and can choose between joining the waiting line, or giving up, possibly fulfilling its request in a different way. When deciding on whether or not to join the queue, the caller weighs the service value against the expected cost associated with waiting, but a caller does not usually take into consideration the negative effect that a joining decision has on other customers who might have as a consequence to wait longer for their turn to be served. The agency may consider ways to increase the aggregate benefit that it generates to its client population, for example by applying a busy-line sound when the queue length exceeds an appropriate threshold, and thus excluding joining decisions that give the customer in question less net benefit than the damage it causes to others. A similar model, and the proposed solution have been the subject of Naor's seminal work [18] , which has been the first to consider customers' decisions in a queueing system. Naor observed the negative externalities that exist in this model, which cause a gap between individual and social optimization, but neither Naor nor the extensive research that followed his paper consider the important question concerning the size of this gap, is it guaranteed to be relatively small or can it be very large or even unbounded? Is it important to apply central control, which may in some cases be costly, or can we let customers make their individually optimal decisions without interference? This question is the subject of our paper. It is raised in real life situations, where central control may have a cost. For instance, in our example, computing the optimal threshold for hanging up may require a statistical research, is it worth the effort? Non-optimality of individual behavior is an intrinsic feature of queues. Naor demonstrated it assuming an observable M/M/1 queue, i.e., one where arriving customers have full information on the queue length, with linear waiting costs and a fixed service value. The arrival process can be centrally controlled to optimize the overall (social) welfare. Admission control can be achieved directly, for example [7] , [13] , [17] , or through pricing of the service, for example [14] , [15] , [18] , [23] . Implementing control mechanisms may be costly, and it is important to know whether it is justified to invest in the regulation of the queue.
The inefficiency of selfish behavior is often measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which bounds the ratio of social welfare under the optimal policy to social welfare under equilibrium. Thus, it measures the extent to which the cost of the Nash equilibrium might exceed that of the optimal solution. The PoA has been studied in various settings: congestion games [12] , routing [20] , [21] , toll competition in a network [22] , network-creation game [4] , supply chains [5] , [6] , system resource allocation [11] , greedy auctions [16] , multiple-items auctions [21] , network resource allocation games [10] , network-pricing games [1] , and more.
There has been little research on quantifying the inefficiency of queueing systems. Haviv and Roughgarden [9] consider a multi-server queueing system, in which the arrivals are routed to the servers, and the routing decisions are not based on the queue lengths. The PoA in such system is bounded from above by the number of servers. Anselmi and Gaujal [2] consider a system of parallel unobservable queues, in which the router has a memory of previous dispatching choices and the demands grow with the network size. We explore the PoA of an observable M/M/1, which is the most fundamental queueing system that involves customers' decision. This model has been studied by Naor [18] .
Naor's M/M/1 model assumes a first-come first-served observable queue (the length can be observed by the decision maker) with a single server, Poisson arrivals, exponential service, linear waiting costs and fixed rewards from obtaining service. Balking is associated with zero reward. The equilibrium solution in this model is very simple since there exists a dominant pure threshold strategy. Namely, for some integer , an arriving customer joins the queue if and only if the observed queue length upon arrival is shorter than , and this strategy maximizes the individual's expected welfare no matter what strategies are adopted by the others. The socially optimal behavior is also characterized by a threshold strategy. Naor observes that the threshold of the optimal strategy is in general smaller than that of the Nash equilibrium strategy. This result also holds for more general queueing models (see [8, §2] for a survey of strategic behavior in observable queueing systems).
In this paper, we explore the PoA and bound its value as a function of the model's parameters. After some preliminary derivations in Section II, we investigate in Section III the PoA as a function of the normalized service values. Our main results are obtained in Section IV were we investigate the behavior of the PoA as a function of the system's utilization, and we conclude with some comments in Section V. . The inset is a zoom-in of the results, where the PoA is non-monotonous.
II. PoA GENERAL BEHAVIOR Following Naor's notation, denotes the arrival rate, and denotes the service rate. The customer obtains a reward of value upon completing service, and a cost of per unit of time spent waiting or in service. Naor's model has been extended in more than one way to include heterogeneous customers, see [8, §2.5] .
In this paper, we analyze Naor's fundamental homogenous model, and the investigation of heterogeneous variations is left for future research. Our results can serve as a benchmark for such variations.
The model's parameters can be normalized so that there are only two relevant parameters:
, which is the arrival rate normalized in service capacity units, and , which is the value of service in terms of expected waiting cost during a service duration. 1 Naor studied the Nash equilibrium and optimal thresholds, and respectively, and their associated social welfare. It is straightforward that . Define , then , where is the unique solution to (1) Naor showed that . Moreover, if and only if . The social welfare associated with a threshold is PoA is defined as the ratio of the expected optimal net gain per time unit , and the expected gain at the equilibrium :
where is the expected queue length, and is the probability that an arriving customer joins the queue. under a threshold .
is shown in Fig. 1 . We measure the inefficiency in the observable M/M/1 by the PoA, and analyze it with respect to the parameters and . We note that bounding the PoA cannot be done by a simple analysis of a two-variables function, i.e., differentiating the function according to each parameter, since the PoA is also a function of the optimal strategy , for which we do not have an implicit form, and its computation is done according to the numerical procedure designed by Naor. Therefore, the investigation of the PoA requires a combination of analytical and numerical approaches.
III. PoA AS A FUNCTION OF Fig. 2 demonstrates the behavior of for various values of . We pay special interest to the behavior of the PoA when , because an infinite asymptotic limit indicates that the PoA is unbounded. The following lemmas describe the three possible limits in association with the value of :
Lemma 3.1: . Proof: Consider the function . For , the optimal social welfare equals , because the queue length distribution is uniform on , and in particular and . A continuous (with respect to ) analysis of yields that it is maximized by . Thus, . By Naor's results, is the floor of ;
; and the social welfare is an unimodal function which is decreasing for . Thus, . We conclude that (4) Specifically, we explore the case when . According to Naor's results: is either the floor or the ceiling of ; is the floor of ; both and goes to infinity when goes to infinity. Thus, when , goes to and goes to . Therefore,
Lemma 3.2:
, .
Proof: For and , by (1)
By (3) Since and we conclude that .
In contrast, , the PoA is decreasing to 1 when : Lemma 3.3:
Proof: When , the solution of (1) satisfies Substituting this relation into (3) gives which tends to 1 as tends to . By Lemma 3.2 the PoA is not bounded when . In the next section we prove that the PoA is bounded when and we find the bound.
IV. POA AS A FUNCTION OF Fig. 3 demonstrates the behavior of for various values of . We consider the upper envelope of the function for , which is demonstrated at the inset of Fig. 3 :
We describe the characteristics of the upper envelope in association with the value of . By Lemma 3.2, is unbounded. for any . Remark: Under the limit case, when , given any threshold , the number of customers in the system is always . This is because at any departure instant, an arrival occurs, due to the infinite arrival rate. The social welfare per unit of time is then . Thus, . An explanation to the latter is that in general, under optimization, customers are allowed to wait to prevent idleness of the server in the future. When the arrival rate is infinite, idleness never occurs. On the . Proof: By (4) For , the right-hand side is at most 1.5, and for its derivative is positive. Therefore, is bounded by the limit when goes to infinity, which is 2 by Lemma 3.1.
The following lemmas will be used in the proof of Theorem 4. Consider two values in such interval. The derivative of (2) with respect to is which is negative when : In contrast, when , is not equal to a single function . Instead, there is an infinite number of functions which define the upper envelope of the PoA in this range. In this small range, when becomes close to 1, the boundary sharply increases to 2.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study explores the PoA in the observable M/M/1 model. The first result is that the PoA in M/M/1 is bounded if . We emphasize that the model does not need to assume for stability, and in fact this number is of no significance in Naor's results. It comes therefore as a surprise that the PoA is bounded if and only if . This finding seems to be related to the fact that is bounded if and only if [see (3) and (5)]. Another interesting result is that for most real situations the PoA is small in comparison with other models discussed in the literature. In particular, when is in [0,0.98175], the bound is . In most real situations falls into this range. When is in the small range between 0.98175 and 1, the PoA is not bounded by a single function. We prove that the tight bound for this range is 2.
A further study could assess the PoA in other queueing systems, in which the self-optimization by individual customers does not optimize public good. For example, it would be interesting to explore the PoA in a GI/M/1 queue, where the arrival process is a general one, and in a GI/M/s system, where there are parallel servers. Like the M/M/1 queue, these systems also have a pure threshold strategy for the Nash equilibrium solution, according to Yechiali [23] , [24] .
